We are very happy to announce the next joint meeting of BGU’s Decision Making and Economic Psychology center (DMEP), HU’s the Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, and the ICORE Center for Empirical Legal Studies of Decision Making and the Law. We will meet on Thursday, May 26, 2015 at the Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality at HU's Edmond J. Safra Campus, Elath Hall Feldman Building. The meeting is supported by BGU's Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business & Management and the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, DMEP, HU’s Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, and ICORE for Behavioral Law of Management and Humanities and Social Sciences, DMEP, HU’s Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, and ICORE for Behavioral Law. We are delighted to have Wilhelm Hofmann, University of Cologne, as our keynote speaker.

Registration is required, please register [here](#). There will be a bus coming from BGU, to secure a spot on the bus, please register before 20 May 2016.

Wilhelm Hofmann is professor of Social and Economic Cognition at the University of Cologne. His main research interests concern the self-regulation of thoughts, feelings, and behavior both in the lab and in the field. Specifically, his research addresses questions such as when and why people decide and act impulsively or reflectively in domains such as eating and drinking, consumer choice, sexual interest behavior, anger expression, or interracial interaction. His research was published in Science, JPSP and PSPB.

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Abstracts:

Keynote speaker: Wilhelm Hofmann, University of Cologne

Morality in Everyday Life
Moral psychology has drawn heavily on lab experiments using well-controlled, but artificial situations. To study morality in everyday life, we conducted an experience sampling study to investigate how often people experience or engage in moral or immoral acts in everyday life and to what extent these experiences relate to individual differences variables. A heterogeneous sample of more than 1,200 adults were signaled 15 times over a three-day period. Moral frequencies, content, emotions, and responses (e.g., desire to punish) were influenced in meaningful ways by socio-demographic factors. Moreover, investigation of temporal dynamics over the course of the day revealed evidence for a moral licensing but not a moral cleansing pattern. Furthermore, moral experiences showed a strong immediate effects on well-being and medium effects on sense of purpose. A subsequent field experiment confirmed this correlational relationship but also suggested that it may be difficult to boost well-being from instructing people to perform moral deeds. Together, the present data suggest that an ecological approach to morality can complement laboratory research in many meaningful ways.

Shoham Choshen-Hillel
(With Alex Shaw and Eugene M. Caruso, University of Chicago)

Fairly Young: Understanding When (and Why) People Give Others the Bigger Piece of the Pie
Children and adults respond negatively to inequity. Traditional accounts of inequity aversion suggest that as children mature into adults they become less likely to endorse all forms of inequity. We challenge the idea that children have a unified concern with inequity that simply becomes stronger with age. Instead, we argue that the developmental trajectory of inequity aversion depends on whether the inequity is seen as fair or unfair. In three studies, older children (7- to 8-year-olds) were more likely than younger children (4- to 6-year-olds) to create inequity that disadvantaged themselves—a “fair” type of inequity. Consistent with our theory, older children were not more likely than younger children to endorse “unfair” types of inequity. I discuss how these results expand upon recent accounts of children’s developing concerns with generosity and partiality.

Yoella Bereby-Meyer
(With Tehila Kogut & Amitai Amir)

Careful Cheating: People Cheat Groups Rather than Individuals
Cheating for material gain is a destructive phenomenon in any society. We examine the extent to which people care about the victims of their unethical behavior—be they a group of people or an individual—and whether they are sensitive to the degree of harm or cost that they cause to these victims. The results of three studies suggest that
when a group (rather than a single individual) is the victim of one’s behavior, the incidence of cheating increases only if the harm to the group is presented in global terms—such that the cheating might be justified by the relatively minor harm caused to each individual in the group (Study #1 and #3). However, when the harm or cost to each individual in the group is made explicit, the tendency to cheat the group is no longer apparent and the tendency to cheat increases when the harm caused is minor—regardless of whether the victim is an individual or a group of people (Study #2). Individual differences in rational and intuitive thinking appear to play different roles in the decision to cheat different type of opponents: individual opponents seem to trigger the subject’s intuitive thinking which restrains the urge to cheat, whereas groups of opponents seem to trigger the subject’s rational mode of thinking which encourage cheating.

12:00-12:30 Coffee break
Session 2  12:30-13:30

Tal Eyal
Judging Near and Distant Vice Revisited
How do people judge transgressions that are rendered harmless by mitigating circumstances, such as when a person derogates a national symbol in private and with no intention to do so? We have previously demonstrated that temporally distant transgressions are judged more severely than near transgressions (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). Based on Construal Level Theory (Liberman & Trope, 2013), we proposed that this effect was due to giving more weight to high-level moral principles and less weight to low-level mitigating circumstances when making judgments about more temporally distant transgressions. Other researchers (Gong & Medin, 2012) reported opposite results, showing that adopting a temporally near perspective and a low-level mindset led to more severe judgments than a temporally distant perspective and a high-level mindset. In an effort to shed light on this theoretical and empirical controversy we conducted several studies that manipulated the temporal distance from harmless transgressions and measured participants’ moral judgment, weight given to high- versus low-level considerations, and emotional reaction. A meta-analysis revealed that temporally distant transgressions were judged more severely than temporally near transgressions and that this effect was driven by higher level of construal and more intense emotional response in the more temporal distance. Interestingly, manipulating level of construal directly led to the opposite effect as has been found by other researchers. These results reveal the complex role psychological distance and level of construal play in moral judgment.

Eliran Halali
(with Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov)
Title: Reciprocating (more) specifically to you: The role of benefactor's identifiability on direct and upstream reciprocity
Research suggests that benefiting from someone’s voluntary, intentional, costly effort encourages reciprocal pro-social behavior, as well as promoting up-stream reciprocity, i.e., increases reciprocal actions by the recipient for the benefit of an unrelated third-party. The current study examines the role of the identifiability of the benefactor in determining the extent to which people engage in direct and in upstream reciprocity. Results of three studies reveal that while an identified benefactor tends to engender greater direct reciprocal reactions than an unidentified one, this strong reaction towards the identified benefactor does not hold to the same extent when upstream reciprocity is considered (regardless of identification of the third-party). On the other hand, when the benefactor is unidentified, levels of direct and upstream reciprocity remain similar. Moderated-mediation analysis suggests that ethical commitment associated with the universal norm of reciprocity explains the decrease in pro-sociality between reactions toward the benefactor him/herself and toward a third-party under the identified condition.

13:30-14:45 Lunch Break

14:45-16:15 Blitz session

Amos Schurr
(Joint with Clil Uliel and Simone Moran)

Title: Judging the Morality Severity and Retribution of Swerving in Self-Driving versus Regular Cars

Abstract: The invention of self-driving cars enables to shed new light on the famous trolley problem whereby an individual chooses whether or not to intervene and save a group of people from dying, by killing one. Here we explore and demonstrate the role of defaults in determining the perceived morality, estimated harm and expected retribution of drivers driving autonomous and regular cars who face a trolley-like problem. In line with previous work on omission and commission, we find that the utilitarian decision to swerve and run over one instead of five individuals is deemed as more moral when it requires overriding a google car default compared to when it requires passively not intervening with a google car default, or when driving a regular car with no externally determined default.

Adiel Moyal
(Joint with Marina Motsenok and Ilana Ritov)

Title: The Effect of Relative Monetary on Envy and Generosity

Abstract: We manipulated the effect of monetary outcomes of the decision maker relative to another participant and examined how it affects the choice between monetary alternatives in two kinds of decisions. The first one is a decision in which allocating more for the other does not come at the expense of the decider, and the second one is a decision which generosity comes at the expense of the other. The findings indicate that the direction of the comparison has an influence on both kinds of decisions- upward comparison was found to significantly reduce the allocations to
the other when it came at the expense of the decider as well as when it did not. Furthermore, the results show that the presence of such social comparisons in and by itself reduces generosity in the second kind of decisions.

Ro'i Zultan  
(Joint with Shlomo Cohen & Shaul Shalvi)  
**Lies, False Implicatures, and Nonlinguistic Deception**  
Deceiving can be effected by means of different forms of communication: (1) lying, or asserting falsehoods, (2) falsely implicating, i.e. asserting something true that in a given context will predictably create false beliefs, and (3) nonlinguistic deception, in particular: performing actions that lead the observer to infer falsehoods. The moral philosophy literature debates whether any form of deception is as such morally worse than any other. We compare the three modes of deception experimentally, both with respect to the inclination to deceive and the inclination to trust potentially deceptive messages or actions. In a two-player game, the first player (sender) is incentivized to influence the beliefs of the second player (receiver), so that the latter invests in a negative expectation prospect. According to the experimental condition, the sender can either lie, use a false implicature, or deceive nonlinguistically. In support of one ethical view rather than others, we see no differences in the amount of deception or of trust among the three conditions.

Andrea Pittarello  
(Joint with Tehila Kogut & Hagit Sabato)  
**Title: To ask or not to ask: Indirect requests increase donations when they enhance involvement**  
Two studies examine the effect of direct and indirect donation requests on people's willingness to donate to either a single identified victim (i.e., a specific child in need) or to a general entity (i.e., a charity association). Overall, indirect requests increased donations more than direct requests. Furthermore, when the target of the helping behavior was a single identified victim (Study 1), indirect requests increased people's motivation to learn more about the victim. This, in turn, boosted affective reactions towards the victim and led to higher donations rates. When the target of the helping behavior was a general entity (Study 2), indirect requests increased people's motivation to learn more about the plight. This, in turn, increased people’s level of engagement in the charitable cause and led to greater donations. Taken together, our results demonstrate that initial uncostly requests for help encourage donations only if they successfully engage people, either emotionally or through more deliberative processes, depending on the target of help.

Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli  
**Title: Agents of Reconciliation: Agency-Affirmation Promotes Constructive Tendencies in Low-Commitment Relationships**  
Abstract: Conflicting parties are motivated to restore their agency, leading to relationship-destructive tendencies. Whereas high relationship-commitment facilitates
constructive tendencies despite the conflict, we theorized that when relationship-commitment is low, affirming the conflicting parties' agency may be a prerequisite for facilitating more constructive tendencies. Three experiments supported our theorizing. Focusing on recalled conflicts between siblings, Study 1 found that self-affirming their agency increased participants' constructive tendencies towards their brother/sister compared to a control/no-affirmation condition. This effect emerged when relationship-commitment was low, but not when it was high. A corresponding self-affirmation of morality did not affect participants' tendencies. Study 2 replicated these results in contexts of workplace conflicts, and further found that the positive effect of agency-affirmation in low-commitment relationships was mediated by participants' ascription of greater importance to moral considerations. Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 when participants were involved in current conflicts at lab.

Shahar Ayal
(With -- Francesca Gino, Rachel Barkan, Dan Ariely)

Title: Three principles to REVISE people's unethical behavior

Abstract
In this article we draw on insights from the growing fields of moral psychology and behavioral ethics to present a 3-principle framework we call REVISE. This framework classifies forces that affect dishonesty into three main categories and then redirects those forces to encourage moral behavior. The first principle, Reminding, emphasizes the effectiveness of subtle cues that increase the salience of morality, and decreases people's ability to justify dishonesty. The second principle, Visibility, aims to restrict anonymity, prompt peer monitoring and elicit responsible norms. The third principle, Self-Engagement, increases people's motivation to maintain a positive self-perception as a moral person and helps bridge the gap between moral values and actual behavior. Combined, the REVISE framework can guide the design of policy interventions to defeat dishonesty.

16:15-16:45
Coffee break
Session 3  16:45-17:45

Yuval Feldman
(Joint work with Eliran Halali)

Title: Can we Regulate “Good” People in Subtle Conflicts of Interest Situations

Abstract: Growing recognition in both the psychological and management literature of the concept of “good people” has caused a paradigm shift in our understand of wrongful behavior: wrongdoings that were previously assumed to be choice-based, conscious, and deliberate decisions, are often the product of intuitive processes that
prevent people from recognizing the wrongfulness of their behavior. This process has been dubbed by several leading scholars as an ethical blind spot. This study will explore the main implications of the good people paradigm on how to. We examined, experimentally, using two m-Turk studies, the efficacy of traditional deterrence and morality-based interventions in encouraging people to maintain their professional integrity and objectivity at the cost of their own self-interest. Results demonstrate that while the manipulated conflict was likely to “corrupt” people under intuitive/automatic mind-set (Experiment 1), explicit/deliberative mechanisms (both deterrence- and morality-based) had a much larger constraining effect overall on participants’ judgment than did implicit measures, with no differences between deterrence and morality (Experiment 2). The findings demonstrate how little is needed to create a risk to the integrity of individuals, but they also suggest that a modest explicit/deliberative intervention can easily remedy much of the wrongdoing.

Uriel Haran
(Joint work with Shaul Shalvi)

Title: Better be wrong than do wrong: Honest advisors are more persuasive than competent ones

Abstract: Accurate advice depends on the advisor’s competence and honesty. Although both incompetence and dishonesty can produce the same advice, the reason for suspecting the advice may affect the degree to which it is followed. We tested the hypothesis that individuals discount advice more when suspecting dishonesty than when suspecting incompetence. Experiments 1 and 2 found that recipients of advice who suspected the advisor’s honesty used the advice less than those who suspected the advisor’s competence. The effect persisted despite the fact that participants did not prefer honesty to competence when seeking advice or when evaluating its quality. Experiments 3 and 4 explored the effect’s underlying processes. Honest error was associated with aleatory uncertainty, caused by random factors, whereas intentional bias was associated with epistemic, man-made uncertainty. Overall, these results suggest that people place an implicit premium on honesty in advice, and demonstrate the importance of advisors’ reputation to their success.

17:45-18:00
Closing, Simone Moran