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| Number | Authour(s) | Title | Date | Published in | Abstract | Paper |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | Oscar Volij | Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence | (01/1992) | Journal of Economic Theory 70 (1996), 391-406 |
Aumann and Brandenburger (1991) describe sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players... |
 dp4.pdf |
| 3 | Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell | A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential | (01/1992) | In R. Selten (ed.) Rational Interaction (1992) Springer-Verlag 83-93 |
Given a (TU or NTU) game in characteristic form an auxiliary two-person zero sum game is... |
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| 2 | Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell | Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: II. The Asymptotic Approach | (01/1992) | Mathematics of Operations Research 20 (1995), 1003-1022 |
This is the second of two papers developing the theory of Egalitarian solutions for games in... |
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| (03/2012) |
finite set of contracts. A solution concept - agreement - generalizes the notion of a stable... |
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| (03/2012) |
function of each player is bounded and continuous. We prove that in this class of games the... |
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| Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman | Disclosure and Choice | (02/2016) |
An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome... |
dp694.pdf |
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| (03/2012) |
c model depends on (i) The way that experts' reputation affectscustomers' preferences, (ii) How... |
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| (03/2012) |
first uncountable ordinal, and that this bound is tight. Also, we examine the connection between... |
