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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published in Abstract Paper
57 Robert J. Aumann & Adam Brandenburger Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (10/1994) Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the...

56 Vijay Krishna & John Morgan An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction (08/1994)

We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and...

55 Jinpeng Ma Stable Matchings and Rematching-Proof Equilibria in a Two-Sided Matching Market (06/1994) Journal of Economic Theory 66 (1995), 352-369

In this paper we introduce the notion of a rematching-proof equilibrium for a two-sided matching...

54 Jinpeng Ma Infinitely Repeated Rental Model with Incomplete Information (06/1994) Economics Letters 49 (1995), 261-266.

In an infinitely repeated rental model with two types of buyer and no discounting, the set of...

53 Sergiu Hart & Dov Monderer Potentials and Weighted Values of Non-Atomic Games (08/1994) Mathematics of Operations Research 22 (1997), 619-630

The "potential approach" to value theory for finite games was introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell...

52 Dieter Balkenborg Strictness and Evolutionary Stability (07/1994)

The notion of a strict equilibrium set is introduced as a natural extension of the notion of a...

51 Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems (06/1994) International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997), 11-26

We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-...

50 Nir Dagan On the Least Sacrifice Principle in Taxation (06/1994)

Utilitarian philosophers and economists recommended that when applying taxation programs,...

49 Eyal Winter Voting and Vetoing (06/1994) American Political Science Review 90 (1996), 813-823

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of non-cooperative...

48 Dieter Balkenborg & Eyal Winter A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction (06/1994) Journal of Mathematical Economics 27 (1997), 325-345

In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the minimal condition on the rationality...

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