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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort descending Abstract Paper
364 Robert J. Aumann and Hillel Furstenberg Findings of the Committee to Investigate the Gans-Inbal Results on Equidistant Letter Sequences in Genesis (06/2004)

In 1996, a committee was formed to examine the results that had been reported by H.J. Gans...

572 Noam Bar-Shai, Tamar Keasar, and Avi Shmida Do Solitary Bees Count to Five? (05/2011)

Efficient foragers avoid returning to food sources that they had previously depleted. Bombus...

189 Anna B. Khmelnitskaya Power Indices Without the Transfer Axiom (01/1999) In H. de Swart (ed.) Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice. Proceedings of the International Conference LGS (1999) Tilburg University Press: 208-213

We show that for voting systems containing at least three voters the set of all marginalist,...

450 Edna Ullmann-Margalit Difficult Choices: To Agonize or not to Agonize? (03/2007) Social Research, 74 (2007), 51-74

What makes a choice difficult, beyond being complex or difficult to calculate? Characterizing...

535 Itai Arieli Backward Induction and Common Strong Belief of Rationality (02/2010)

In 1995, Aumann showed that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality is...

250 Pradeep Dubey & Ori Haimanko Envy and the Optimality of Tournaments (06/2001)

We show that tournaments tend to outperform piece-rate contracts when there is sufficient envy...

43 Nir Dagan Consistency, Decentralization and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence (01/1994)

In this paper we study finite-agent exchange economies. We extend the classical model by adding...

237 Itzhak Venezia, Dan Galai & Zur Shapira Exclusive vs. Independent Agents: A Separating Equilibrium Approach (02/2001) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 40 (1999), 443-456.

We provide a separating equilibrium explanation for the existence of the independent insurance...

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