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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort descending Abstract Paper
189 Anna B. Khmelnitskaya Power Indices Without the Transfer Axiom (01/1999) In H. de Swart (ed.) Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice. Proceedings of the International Conference LGS (1999) Tilburg University Press: 208-213

We show that for voting systems containing at least three voters the set of all marginalist,...

66 Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell Bargaining and Value (01/1995) Econometrica 64 (1996), 357-380

We present and analyze a model of non-cooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to...

276 Jean-Francois Mertens & Abraham Neyman A Value on 'AN (11/2001) International Journal of Game Theory 32 (2003), 109-120

We prove here the existence of a value (of norm 1) on the spaces 'NA and even 'AN, the closure...

152 Eilon Solan Repeated Team Games with Absorbing States (07/1997)

Two teams meet every day to play the same matrix game. Every entry in the matrix contains five...

356 Michael Goldstein, Paul Irvine, Eugene Kandel and Zvi Wiener Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading Patterns (03/2004)

Why do brokers charge per-share commissions to institutional traders? What determines the...

237 Itzhak Venezia, Dan Galai & Zur Shapira Exclusive vs. Independent Agents: A Separating Equilibrium Approach (02/2001) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 40 (1999), 443-456.

We provide a separating equilibrium explanation for the existence of the independent insurance...

439 Rachel Arnon, Tamar Keasar, Dan Cohen and Avi Shmida Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) (12/2006)

The vertical inflorescences of several plant species are terminated by colorful bracts, which...

321 Thierry Foucault, Ohad Kadan & Eugene Kandel Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity (06/2003)

We develop a dynamic model of an order-driven market populated by discretionary liquidity...

33 Philip J. Reny, Eyal Winter & Myrna Holtz Wooders The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments (09/1993)

We introduce the notion of the partnered core of a game. A payoff is partnered if there are no...

527 Bezalel Peleg and Shmuel Zamir On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case (12/2009) Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare

We investigate sufficient conditions for the existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibria that satisfy...

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