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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort descending Abstract Paper
234 Sergiu Hart Values of Perfectly Competitive Economies (01/2001) In R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory, with Economic Applications. (2002) Vol. III, Ch. 57, Elsevier/North-Holland

This chapter is devoted to the study of economic models with many agents, each of whom is...

505 Eyal Winter Incentive Reversal (02/2009)

By incentive reversal we refer to situations in which an increase of rewards for all agents...

381 Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions I: Demand Queries (02/2005)

We study the computational power and limitations of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most...

318 Paul Schweinzer Dissolving a Common Value Partnership in a Repeated 'queto' Game (05/2003)

We analyse a common value, alternating ascending bid, first price auction as a repeated game of...

591 Todd R. Kaplan and Shmuel Zamir Multiple Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (11/2011)

Maskin and Riley (2003) and Lebrun (2006) prove that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of first-price...

471 Ehud Guttel The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions (12/2007) Virginia Law Review 93 (2007), 1389-1435

Under the conventional tort law paradigm, a tortfeasor behaves unreasonably when two conditions...

28 Alon Harel Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Doctrine of Comparative Fault (06/1993) California Law Review 82 (1994), 1181-1222

Criminal law is traditionally described as directing its injunctions exclusively to actual or...

116 Olivier Gossner Comparison of Information Structures (09/1996) Games and Economic Behavior 30 (2000), 44-63.

We introduce two ways of comparing two information structures, say I and J. First, I is richer...

554 Eytan Sheshinski Limits on Individual Choice (06/2010)

Individuals behave with choice probabilities defined by a multinomial logit (MNL) probability...

202 Peter Sudholter, Joachim Rosenmuller & Bezalel Peleg The Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form: Part II - Representation (08/1999) Journal of Mathematical Economics 33(2000),299-338

This paper exhibits to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a 'canonical' game in...

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