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Number Authour(s) Title Datesort ascending Published in Abstract Paper
83 Yossi Feinberg A Converse to the Agreement Theorem (11/1995)

In Aumann (1976) - "Agreeing to Disagree" - it is shown that if there is a common prior then...

85 Yossi Feinberg An Incomplete Cooperation Structure for a Voting Game Can Be Stable (11/1995) Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 2-9

Aumann and Myerson (1988) defined a linking game leading to the formation of cooperation...

88 Abraham Neyman Cooperation, Repetition and Automata (11/1995) In S. Hart & A. Mas-Colell (eds.), Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, (1995) Springer-Verlag 233-255

This chapter studies the implications of bounding the complexity of players' strategies in long...

84 Eytan Sheshinski On Atmosphere Externality and Corrective Taxes (10/1995) Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004), 727-734

It has been argued that in the presence of an `Atmosphere Externality' and competitive behavior...

81 Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler The Reactive Bargaining Set: Structure, Dynamics and Extension to NTU Games (08/1995) International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997) 75-95.

The reactive bargaining set (Granot [1994]) is the set of outcomes for which no justified...

80 Abraham Neyman Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games (07/1995) International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997), 223-227

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets...

82 Abraham Neyman & Sylvain Sorin Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: The Deterministic Symmetric Case (07/1995) In T. Parthasaraty et al. (eds.) Game-Theoretic Applications to Economics and Operations Research ( ) Kluwer Academic Press

Every two person game of incomplete information in which the information to both players is...

69 Abraham Neyman Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata (06/1995) (revised in DP #161)

The paper studies the implication of bounding the complexity of the strategies players may...

79 Mathias Risse A Syntactic Model of Forgetting: A Partially Solved Problem (06/1995)

We look at a set % of states of the world which are defined as maximal consistent lists of...

78 Robert J. Aumann Reply to Margalit and Yaari (06/1995) In K. J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman & C. Schmidt (eds.), The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior (1996), Macmillan, Basingstoke and London 106-107

A reply to Margalit and Yaari's paper "Rationality and Comprehension", in which they comment on...

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