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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort descending Abstract Paper
649 Bezalel Peleg Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization (10/2013)

We add two results to the theory of consistent voting. Let M be the set of all survivors of some...

71 Maya Bar-Hillel, Efrat Neter Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange Lottery Tickets? (03/1995) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70 (1996), 17-27

In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that people are reluctant to exchange lottery tickets...

612 Yehuda (John) Levy A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Equilibria: The Case of Absolutely Continuous Transitions (06/2012)

We present a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states, finitely many players and...

699 Maya Bar-Hillel Reply to Rodway, Schepman & Thoma (2016) (04/2016)
663 Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown (03/2014)

Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market allocation that prima facie...

629 Omer Edhan Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies (10/2012)

We prove that a single-valued solution of perfectly competitive TU economies underling nonatomic...

712 Sergiu Hart, Philip J. Reny The Better Half of Selling Separately (12/2017)

Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least 62% of the optimal revenue...

182 Gil Kalai, Brendan McKay, Maya Bar-Hillel The Two Famous Rabbis Experiments: How Similar is Too Similar? (09/1998)

Witztum, Rips and Rosenberg describe the outcomes of two experiments which purport to...

681 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games (04/2015) IGTR's Volume 17, Issue 4, Pages 1-7.

We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non...

560 Ziv Hellman Almost Common Priors (09/2010)

What happens when priors are not common? We show that for each type profile τ over a knowledge...

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