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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort ascending Abstract Paper
399 Gil Kalai Noise Sensitivity and Chaos in Social Choice Theory (08/2005)

In this paper we study the social preferences obtained from monotone neutral social welfare...

8 Sergiu Hart On Prize Games (05/1992) Essays in Game Theory, N. Megiddo (ed.), Springer-Verlag (1994), 111-121

We consider the class of hyperplane coalition games (H-games): the feasible set of each...

489 Alon Harel and Tsvi Kahana The Easy Core Case for Judicial Review (09/2008)

This paper defends judicial review on the grounds that judicial review is necessary for...

201 Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter Single-Peakedness and Coalition-Proofness (08/1999) Review of Economic Design 4 (1999), 381-387

We prove that multidimensional generalized median voter schemes are coalition-proof.

97 Igal Milchtaich Generic Uniqueness of Equilibria in Nonatomic Congestion Games (01/1996)

Generic uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome...

449 Andriy Zapechelnyuk Better-Reply Strategies with Bounded Recall (03/2007)

A decision maker (an agent) is engaged in a repeated interaction with Nature. The objective of...

141 Robert S. Simon The Difference between Common Knowledge of Formulas and Sets (05/1997) International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999), 367-384.

This article concerns the interactive model propositional calculus, using the multi-agent...

534 Marco Francesconi, Christian Ghiglino and Motty Perry On the Origin of the Family (02/2010)

This paper presents an overlapping generations model to explain why humans live in families...

249 Pradeep Dubey & Ori Haimanko Unilateral Deviations with Perfect Information (06/2001)

For extensive form games with perfect information, consider a learning process in which, at any...

19 Bezalel Peleg & Stef Tijs The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form (11/1992) International Journal of Game Theory 25 (1996), 13-34

We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence...

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