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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort ascending Abstract Paper
81 Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler The Reactive Bargaining Set: Structure, Dynamics and Extension to NTU Games (08/1995) International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997) 75-95.

The reactive bargaining set (Granot [1994]) is the set of outcomes for which no justified...

340 Yaakov Kareev and Massimo Warglien Cognitive Overload and the Evaluation of Risky Alternatives: The Effects of Sample Size, Information Format and Attitude To Risk (10/2003)

When the amount of information to be dealt with exceeds people’s short-term memory capacity,...

221 Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir The Strategic Use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions (07/2000)

In the framework of a first-price private-value auction, we study the seller as a player in a...

99 Mordecai Haimovich The Simplex Algorithm Is Very Good!: On the Expected Number of Pivot Steps and Related Properties of Random Linear Programs (02/1996)

In their paper How Good is the Simplex Algorithm?, Klee and Minty exhibited a sequence of linear...

423 Ifat Maoz, Ilan Yaniv and Naama Ivri Decision Framing and Support for Concessions in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (05/2006) Journal of Peace Research (forthcoming)

The purpose of the study is to explore, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the...

306 David Assaf, Larry Goldstein & Ester Samuel-Cahn Two Choice Optimal Stopping (12/2002) Advances of Applied Probability 36 (2004), 1116-1147

Let Xn, . . . ,X1 be i.i.d. random variables with distribution function F. A statistician,...

511 M. Vittoria Levati and Ro’i Zultan Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (05/2009) Games 2011, 2(1), 1-15.

This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the...

387 R. J. Aumann and J. H. Dreze When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect? (03/2005) Published as "Rational Expectations in Games," American Economic Review 98 (2008), 72-86

Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This...

148 Werner Guth & Bezalel Peleg When Will Payoff Maximization Survive? (06/1997) Journal of Evolutionary Economics 11 (2001), 479-499

Survival of the fittest means that phenotypes behave as if they would maximize reproductive...

48 Dieter Balkenborg & Eyal Winter A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction (06/1994) Journal of Mathematical Economics 27 (1997), 325-345

In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the minimal condition on the rationality...

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