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Number Authour(s) Titlesort descending Date Published in Abstract Paper
668 Abba M. Krieger, Ester Samuel-Cahn A generalized secretary problem (07/2014)

A new Secretary Problem is considered, where for fixed k and m one wins if at some time i = m(j...

363 Olle Haggstrom, Gil Kalai and Elchanan Mossel A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority (06/2004)

Consider an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and...

575 Florian M. Biermann A Measure to compare Matchings in Marriage Markets (06/2011)

In matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion to compare...

10 Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell A Model of n-Person Non-Cooperative Bargaining (07/1992) Pubslied as "Bargaining and Value" in Econometrica 64 (1996), 357-380

We present and analyze a model of non-cooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to...

48 Dieter Balkenborg & Eyal Winter A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction (06/1994) Journal of Mathematical Economics 27 (1997), 325-345

In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the minimal condition on the rationality...

3 Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential (01/1992) In R. Selten (ed.) Rational Interaction (1992) Springer-Verlag 83-93

Given a (TU or NTU) game in characteristic form an auxiliary two-person zero sum game is...

21 Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core (11/1992) Econometrica 62 (1994), 795-818

Much of the core's appeal stems from the intuitive and natural story behind it, the story that...

37 Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules (12/1993) Games and Economic Behavior 18 (1997), 55-72

We introduce a game form that captures a non-cooperative dimension of the consistency property...

240 Peter Sudholter & Bezalel Peleg A Note on an Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games (05/2001) Mathematics of Operations Research 27 (2002), 441-444

As shown by Peleg, the core of market games is characterized by nonemptiness, individual...

291 Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions (02/2002)

We formulate a way to study whether the asymmetry of buyers (in the sense of having different...

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