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Number  Authour(s)  Title  Date  Published in  Abstract  Paper 

306  David Assaf, Larry Goldstein & Ester SamuelCahn  Two Choice Optimal Stopping  (12/2002)  Advances of Applied Probability 36 (2004), 11161147 
Let Xn, . . . ,X1 be i.i.d. random variables with distribution function F. A statistician,... 
dp306.pdf 
73  Amnon Rapoport, Darryl A. Seale & James A. Sundali  Equilibrium play in large group market entry games  (03/1995)  Management Science 44 (1998), 119141 
Coordination behavior is studies experimentally in a class of market entry games featuring... 

511  M. Vittoria Levati and Ro’i Zultan  Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a RealTime Voluntary Contribution Mechanism  (05/2009)  Games 2011, 2(1), 115. 
This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a realtime version of the... 
dp511.pdf 
387  R. J. Aumann and J. H. Dreze  When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?  (03/2005)  Published as "Rational Expectations in Games," American Economic Review 98 (2008), 7286 
Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This... 
86.pdf 
126  Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell  A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium  (01/1997)  (revised in DP #166) 
We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart... 
adapt.html 
596  Yehuda (John) Levy  A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium  (01/2012) 
We present an example of a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states, finitely many... 
dp596.pdf  
477  Bezalel Peleg and Shmuel Zamir  Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case  (03/2008) 
We provide an extension of the Condorcet Theorem. Our model includes both the NitzanParoush... 
dp477.pdf  
189  Anna B. Khmelnitskaya  Power Indices Without the Transfer Axiom  (01/1999)  In H. de Swart (ed.) Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice. Proceedings of the International Conference LGS (1999) Tilburg University Press: 208213 
We show that for voting systems containing at least three voters the set of all marginalist,... 

89  Igal Milchtaich  Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space  (12/1995)  Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 2546 
The following generalization of a theorem of Aumann and Shapley is proved: A vector measure game... 
dp89.pdf 
232  Bezalel Peleg & Eyal Winter  Constitutional Implementation  (01/2001)  Review of Economic Design (2002) 7, 187204 
We consider the problem of implementing a social choice correspondence H in Nash equilibrium... 
dp232.pdf 