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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort ascending Abstract Paper
306 David Assaf, Larry Goldstein & Ester Samuel-Cahn Two Choice Optimal Stopping (12/2002) Advances of Applied Probability 36 (2004), 1116-1147

Let Xn, . . . ,X1 be i.i.d. random variables with distribution function F. A statistician,...

73 Amnon Rapoport, Darryl A. Seale & James A. Sundali Equilibrium play in large group market entry games (03/1995) Management Science 44 (1998), 119-141

Coordination behavior is studies experimentally in a class of market entry games featuring...

511 M. Vittoria Levati and Ro’i Zultan Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (05/2009) Games 2011, 2(1), 1-15.

This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the...

387 R. J. Aumann and J. H. Dreze When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect? (03/2005) Published as "Rational Expectations in Games," American Economic Review 98 (2008), 72-86

Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This...

126 Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (01/1997) (revised in DP #166)

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart...

596 Yehuda (John) Levy A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium (01/2012)

We present an example of a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states, finitely many...

477 Bezalel Peleg and Shmuel Zamir Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case (03/2008)

We provide an extension of the Condorcet Theorem. Our model includes both the Nitzan-Paroush...

189 Anna B. Khmelnitskaya Power Indices Without the Transfer Axiom (01/1999) In H. de Swart (ed.) Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice. Proceedings of the International Conference LGS (1999) Tilburg University Press: 208-213

We show that for voting systems containing at least three voters the set of all marginalist,...

89 Igal Milchtaich Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space (12/1995) Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 25-46

The following generalization of a theorem of Aumann and Shapley is proved: A vector measure game...

232 Bezalel Peleg & Eyal Winter Constitutional Implementation (01/2001) Review of Economic Design (2002) 7, 187-204

We consider the problem of implementing a social choice correspondence H in Nash equilibrium...

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