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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort ascending Abstract Paper
278 Gil Kalai, Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales (11/2001) Econometrica 70 (2002), 2481-2488.

The paper presents a notion of rationalizing choice functions that violate the “Independence of...

89 Igal Milchtaich Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space (12/1995) Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 25-46

The following generalization of a theorem of Aumann and Shapley is proved: A vector measure game...

358 Flavio Toxvaerd Time of the Essence (05/2004)

In most industries, ranging from information systems development to construction, an...

175 Eilon Solan Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibria (06/1998)

The paper studies extensive-form correlated equilibria in stochastic games. An extensive-form...

441 Clelia Di Serio, Yosef Rinott and Marco Scarsini Simpson’s Paradox for the Cox Model (01/2007) Scandinavian Journal of Statistics 36, 463-480 (2009)

In the context of survival analysis, we define a covariate X as protective (detrimental) for the...

38 Murali Agastya An Evolutionary Bargaining Model (12/1993) (revised in DP #61)

Varying quantities of a single good can be produced using at least two and at most n factors of...

323 Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, and Ton Storcken Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (07/2003) International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2005), 381-396

A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in...

529 Yakov Babichenko Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibria (01/2010)

A completely uncoupled dynamic is a repeated play of a game, where each period every player...

138 Ilan Yaniv & Dean Foster Precision and Accuracy of Judgmental Estimation (04/1997) Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 10 (1997), 21-32

Whereas probabilistic calibration has been a central normative concept of accuracy in previous...

223 Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization (08/2000) Social Choice and Welfare 19 (2002), 241-263

The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston....

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