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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort descending Abstract Paper
272 Abraham Neyman Real Algebraic Tools in Stochastic Games (09/2001) In Stochastic Games and Applications, A. Neyman and S. Sorin (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Press (2003)

The present chapter brings together parts of the theory of polynomial equalities and...

148 Werner Guth & Bezalel Peleg When Will Payoff Maximization Survive? (06/1997) Journal of Evolutionary Economics 11 (2001), 479-499

Survival of the fittest means that phenotypes behave as if they would maximize reproductive...

352 Dan Cohen The Evolutionary Ecology of Species Diversity in Stressed and Extreme Environments (03/2004)
233 Albert Blarer, Tamar Keasar & Avi Shmida Possible Mechanisms for the Formation of Flower Size Preferences by Foraging Bumblebees (01/2001) Journal of Ethology 108 (2003), 341-351

Large flowers often contain larger nectar rewards, and receive more pollinator visits, than...

435 Abraham Neyman and Joel Spencer Complexity and Effective Prediction (10/2006)

Let G = (I,J,g) be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game...

266 Eyal Winter Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility (08/2001)

We consider a model of hierarchical organizations in which agents have the option ofreducing the...

29 Maya Bar-Hillel & David Budescu The Elusive Wishful Thinking Effect (07/1993) Thinking and Reasoning 1 (1995), 71-104

We define a desirability effect as the inflation of the judged probability of desirable events...

523 Ziv Hellman Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games (10/2009)

This paper is concerned with the question of extending the definition of the bargaining set, a...

399 Gil Kalai Noise Sensitivity and Chaos in Social Choice Theory (08/2005)

In this paper we study the social preferences obtained from monotone neutral social welfare...

115 Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young Learning with Hazy Beliefs (09/1996) Published as: "Learning, Hypothesis Testing, and Nash Equilibrium", Games and Economic Behavior 25 (2003), 73-96.

Players are rational if they always choose best replies given their beliefs. They are good...

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