# Publications

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Number | Authour(s) | Title | Date | Published in | Abstract | Paper |
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49 | Eyal Winter | Voting and Vetoing | (06/1994) | American Political Science Review 90 (1996), 813-823 |
The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of non-cooperative... |
dp49.pdf |

50 | Nir Dagan | On the Least Sacrifice Principle in Taxation | (06/1994) |
Utilitarian philosophers and economists recommended that when applying taxation programs,... |
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52 | Dieter Balkenborg | Strictness and Evolutionary Stability | (07/1994) |
The notion of a strict equilibrium set is introduced as a natural extension of the notion of a... |
dp52.pdf | |

53 | Sergiu Hart & Dov Monderer | Potentials and Weighted Values of Non-Atomic Games | (08/1994) | Mathematics of Operations Research 22 (1997), 619-630 |
The "potential approach" to value theory for finite games was introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell... |
pot-w.html |

56 | Vijay Krishna & John Morgan | An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction | (08/1994) |
We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and... |
dp56.pdf | |

57 | Robert J. Aumann & Adam Brandenburger | Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium | (10/1994) | Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180 |
Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the... |
dp57.pdf |

58 | Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman & Benyamin Shitovitz | Core and Stable Sets of Large Games Arising in Economics | (11/1994) | Journal of Economic Theory 68 (1996), 200-211 |
It is shown that the core of a non-atomic glove-market game which is defined as the minimum of... |
dp58.pdf |

64 | Jacob Glazer & Motty Perry | Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction | (12/1994) | Games and Economic Behavior 15 (1996), 27-32 |
We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form mechanism... |
dp64.pdf |

62 | Murali Agastya | Ordinality of the Shapley Value | (12/1994) |
In Roth (1977) it is argued that the Shapley value is the cardinal utility of playing a game and... |
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59 | Robert J. Aumann | Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality | (12/1994) | Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1995), 6-19 |
We formulate precisely and prove the proposition that if common knowledge of rationality obtains... |