|78||Robert J. Aumann||Reply to Margalit and Yaari||(06/1995)||In K. J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman & C. Schmidt (eds.), The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior (1996), Macmillan, Basingstoke and London 106-107||
A reply to Margalit and Yaari's paper "Rationality and Comprehension", in which they comment on...
|393||Robert J. Aumann, Sergiu Hart and Motty Perry||Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle||(06/2005)||
This paper undertakes a careful examination of the concept of conditional probability and its...
|602||Omer Edhan||Values of Nondifferentiable Vector Measure Games||(03/2012)||
We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This novel approach ...
|687||Nadav Amir||Uniqueness of optimal strategies in captain lotto games||(06/2015)||
We consider the class of two-person zero-sum allocation games known as Captain Lotto games (Hart...
|570||Maya Bar-Hillel||Surprising Psychology And The New Unconscious: Challenges For The Law. (In Hebrew) פסיכולוגיה מפתיעה והלא מודע החדש: אתגרים לעולם המשפט||(03/2011)||The Law & Business Journal (IDC, Israel) , Issue 12 (September 2010), p. 13-40||
Recent research in psychology, especially that called "The New Unconscious", is...
|655||Tomás Rodríguez-Barraquer||From sets of equilibria to structures of interaction underlying binary games of strategic complements||(12/2013)||
Consider a setting in which agents can each take one of two ordered actions and in which the...
|13||David Budescu, Maya Bar-Hillel||To Guess or Not to Guess||(09/1992)||Journal of Educational Measurement 30 (1993), 277-291||
Multiple choice tests that are scored by formula scoring typically include instructions that...
|618||Mikel Alvarez-Mozos, Ziv Hellman, Eyal Winter||Spectrum Value for Coalitional Games||(08/2012)||Forthcoming in GEB||
Assuming a `spectrum' or ordering on the players of a coalitional game, as in a political...
|702||Ohad Navon||Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Random Games and the Facets of Random Polytopes||(09/2016)||
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions...
|671||Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters||Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered||(12/2014)||
We show that feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m...