Publishing:

Worl Scientific

Date:

January, 2013

Abstract:

This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu
Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction
of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple
and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial
finding—boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long
run—generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies.
In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: uncoupledness,
whereby decision-makers do not know each other’s payoffs and utilities (so, while
chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out
to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections
to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science
and engineering (e.g., via notions of “regret”).
Simple Adaptive Strategies is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together
with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space
is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for
advanced graduate courses—in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer
science, engineering—and for further research.