On a Class of Vertices of the Core (joint with Michel Grabisch)

: It is known that for convex TU games the vertices of the core are the marginal vectors, and this result remains true for games where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice. We propose a larger class of vertices for games on distributive lattices, called min-max vertices, obtained by minimizing or maximizing in a given order the coordinates of a core element. We show that, for connected hierarchies (and for the general case under some restrictions), there is a simple recursive formula generating some of them.

How we do and could cooperate: A Kantian explanation

Standard game theory’s theory of cooperation is based upon threatened punishment of non-cooperators in a repeated game, which induces a Nash equilibrium in which cooperation is observed.   Thus, cooperation in games is explained as a non-cooperative equilibrium.  Behavioral economics, on the other hand, explains cooperative behavior by inserting ‘exotic’ agruments into preferences  (altruism, fairness, etc.), and  again deducing cooperation as a Nash equilibrium in a game with non-standard preferences.   In both variants, cooperation is envisaged as achievable as

Ester Samuel Cohen Memorial

[[{"type":"media","view_mode":"media_large","fid":"2849","attributes":{"alt":"","class":"media-image","height":"339","style":"font-size: 13.008px; width: 980px; height: 692px;","typeof":"foaf:Image","width":"480"}}]]


Subscribe to The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality RSS