Coalition-Proof Communication Equilibria

Authors: 
Ezra Einy & Bezalel Peleg
Abstract: 

We offer a definition of coalition-proof communication equilibria. The use of games of incomplete information is essential to our approach. Deviations of coalition are introduced after their players are informed of the actions they should follow. therefore, improvements by coalition on a given correlated strategy should always be made when their players have private information. Coalition-proof communication equilibria of two-person games are characterized by "information efficiency". Several examples are analyzed, including the Voting Paradox.

Date: 
July, 1992
Published in: 
Social Choice Welfare and Ethics, W.A. Barnet, H. Moulin, M. Salles & N.J. Schofield (eds.), Cambridge University Press (1995), 289-300
Number: 
9